Let us reestablish our historical narrative. The Han Dynasty fell to the warlords in 220 CE, who established three warring kingdoms – Wu, Wei, and Shu Han, appropriately called the Three Kingdoms period. Wang Bi lived at the beginning of this period. The northern Wei kingdom prevailed, conquering the other 2 kingdoms by 280 establishing the Chin dynasty. China after so many years of civil war had been weakened. They had not been able to control the growing power of the nomadic tribes of the north. In 316 “declaring themselves the rightful heirs of the Han, these Hsiung-nu attacked and pillaged” {p.79] the Chin capital at Ch’ang-an. The remnants of the Chin dynasty moved south, as always. This began the period in Chinese history called the Sixteen Kingdoms, because China was split up into many warring kingdoms, primarily in the north. Chinese warlords, Tibetan tribes, Mongolian tribes and the Hsiung-nu all battled for supremacy amongst themselves.
“After 316 two quite different societies developed in the north and the south, though both used Han as their model since no other model for a sedentary, centralized state was at hand.” [1]
The north was infused with the nomadic traditions, while the south further mixed the cultured Han tradition. Let us remember that this was nothing new. The peaceful southeast Asian culture had percolated up into the fertile Yangtze River valley. The northern tribes had conquered the existent Neolithic agri-cultures and established themselves as military overlords. The first Chinese dynasties the Xia and Shang established themselves in the fertile Yellow River Valley of the north. While the Shang didn’t seem to have established an imperial political presence in the south, it seems that their cultural influence was certainly felt. The Chou dynasty coming from the northwest extended the Imperial influence into eastern China to the coast.
Remember that China had no real borders. Wherever the Imperial capital was located was the head of the dynasty, geography wasn’t the issue. This is called a mandala style organization. The military aristocracy was such an overlay upon the indigenous agri-cultures that where the imperial government and their court resided was the location of the government. Regularly throughout Chinese history we see this phenomenon occurring. The dynasty is almost identified with its capital. As an example, the Chou Dynasty is divided into Western and Eastern Chou by the location of the capital.
Contrast that with the European development, where the rulers, although also part of a military aristocracy seemed to more tied to their cultural geography [2]. The French when conquered did not move south into Spain. The leaders of the warring Italian or German states seemed to be tied more intimately to their location. The European rulers tended to be more connected culturally with their peasantry, than the Chinese rulers were with theirs.
To elucidate this idea, let it be pointed that there were major geographical reasons behind this. France and Spain were separated by the imposing Pyrenees. France and England were separated by the treacherous English Channel. France, Switzerland, and Italy were separated by the impassable Alps. Thus many of the European cultures were separated by such intense geographical boundaries that cultures developed in isolation creating a unique sense of national identity based somewhat on a common language.
Although most frequently the rulers came from a different cultural background than the peasantry they ruled, after the centuries of geographic separation they became associated with their geography. The Celts established themselves as overlords of Britain and Ireland on top of the indigenous Picts. The Germanic Franks established themselves as overlords in France over the indigenous Gauls. A variety of Viking raiders established leadership over parts of France and Germany. The ‘French’ Normans established themselves over the Saxons of England who themselves had come from the Continent to become overlords of the agricultural peasantry of Britain. In each case the ruling class within a few centuries had melded with the local culture to the extent that their customs were different enough to consider themselves a separate culture.
Many times this even entailed speaking a language that was different from their original tongue. The French Normans, four centuries after conquering England couldn’t speak French anymore because of their extended geographical separation.
Because of this cultural assimilation of the ruling class and the peasantry due to relative geographical isolation, there developed a sense of cultural identity between ruler and ruled that seemed to absent from Chinese politics. While the peasantry might be at odds with the aristocracy in European politics they still considered themselves a common culture with their rulers. The French peasantry, while oppressed by the aristocracy, would still fight to the death against English invaders. Witness the Joan of Arc phenomenon in France when she inspired the people to fight against the invading British.[3] The Chinese peasantry were not a military factor except in the sense that they could be drafted to fight. Contrast this with England where the agricultural peasantry fought the Roman army to a standstill. Throughout the Scottish/English interaction, the Clan peasantry always had to be factored in militarily. There are geographic reasons for this difference.
Geographically the wide eastern coastal plain connects all of China proper. It is only split into the north and south by a mountain range that separates the Yangtze and Yellow River valleys, which merge on the eastern coast. Hence any political power, which was strong enough to control the coast, could easily dominate both the Yangtze and Yellow River Valley cultures.
Whenever the Imperial government wasn’t strong enough to control the coast, China would always separate into at least a northern and southern government based around the two river valleys. Sometimes the government wouldn’t even be strong enough to control the entire north or south, at which times these political grouping would splinter further. The point here is that ruling class was never disconnected from itself to grow into separate cultures. This created a fluid aristocracy, which could relocate as circumstances permitted. The Shang contracted; the Chou and Chin dynasties both moved south after nomadic invaders sacked their capitals.
While the Chinese aristocracy was geographically fluid, the peasantry weren’t. While the aristocracy was bound by literacy from the earliest dynastic times, the peasantry had established local languages and customs which differed just as much as the European cultural differentiation.
Thus while the Chinese aristocracy was bound together by their literacy and resulting cultural traditions, this same literacy separated them further from the agricultural peasantry. This was not the case in Europe, where literacy was for scholars or monks, but not necessarily for the aristocracy. Indeed until the Crusades about 1100 AD exposed the European aristocracy to true imperial traditions, the aristocracy mainly differentiated themselves from the peasantry by their military training. They ate the same food except more of it. In China the cultural differentiation based upon literacy could have begun up to 2000 years earlier in the late Shang or early Chou. While European rulers patronized science and the arts, it was not considered a necessary aristocratic talent. In China by the Han times literacy was institutionalized as a necessary talent of the ruling class. Thus the glue that bound the aristocracy, separated them from the peasantry.
Also national pride in China was more of an aristocratic phenomenon, as they were bound by this common literary tradition. Remember that learning to read and write Chinese is so difficult that illiterate Chinese immigrants who came to America were more likely to learn our European alphabet than they were to bring the Chinese ideograms to express their own language. While national pride was aristocratic, the pride of the peasantry was local. In Europe the national pride seemed to extend into the both aristocracy and peasantry based upon participation in a common language and culture.
Because literacy was such a dominant criterion for the Chinese ruling class, anyone who could afford the necessary books and teachers to learn to read could become part of the Chinese aristocracy, with all the privileges that entailed. This allowed the incorporation of alien cultures into the Chinese system. Nomadic raiders could establish themselves as legitimate rulers of any northern state merely by following the traditional rules of Chinese leadership. Contrast this with Europe where bloodline was of paramount importance.
Because the literacy and cultural traditions transcended geographical location for the Chinese aristocracy, and because the military nomadic cultures of the north were the normal invaders, while the southern cultures tended to be more peaceful, the Chinese imperial government always move south to the Yangtze River Valley in case of danger. For militarily weak empires the further away from that dangerous Ordos plain the better. If thing got too bad, it was a good idea to move to the other side, the southern, of the Yangtze River for increased protection. Inevitably however the military north in combat would eventually conquer the south. Hence the Chou conquered the Shang from the northwest. Then the Ch’in conquered the Chou from the northwest. The northern state of Chin reunited the Three Kingdoms of China. Never in historical times has a southern dynasty conquered the north, it is the north which has always conquered the south. It is no accident that the capital of the modern Chinese state is in Beijing in the north.
Similarly in this historical narrative. The 16 northern kingdoms became toughened in constant warfare between themselves, while the south became softer militarily with no great threats except from the northern states, which were warring amongst themselves. When the northern states finally coalesced under a single leader, the Sui, they easily conquered the southern kingdom whose capital was at Nanking in 581. Thus north and south China were reunited again politically for the first time since the Chin had been overthrown in 316 over 250 years before.
Thus culturally the south was always the more artistic participating in the peaceful culture of Southeast Asia, while the north was always more military mixing continually with the nomadic cultures of the north, Southern China tended to more artistic and less rigid, while the north tended to more military and more disciplined. A constant Chinese geographical mechanism is that the military culture would dominate the north and then gradually extend southwards. Mixing with the artistic south they would become more vibrant and creative culture. The nomadic cultures of the north would come conquering again, inevitably extending south to be mixed up again with the Taoist cultural traditions. This is again the case with the ascendancy of the Sui.
The consolidation of the 16 northern kingdoms occurred under the T’o-pa, a proto-Turkic tribe who had been subservient to the proto-Mongolian nomadic tribe who had succeeded them. How did this occur? There were a few external factors. The nomadic tribes on their borders, the Turks had splintered and were fighting amongst themselves. Further the southern Chinese state was weak.
But there were internal factors as well for the success of the T’o-pa in reuniting China. First very early on the great Chinese families had begun to assimilate with the invading nomads. Yang Chien married into a T’o-pa aristocratic family, becoming a general and minister. His daughter married the ruler and gave birth to a son. When the ruler died, Yang Chien accepted the leadership in place of his grandson, establishing the beginning of the Sui dynasty. He consolidated the north by promising tolerance to the three religions, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, and by building great public works, including roads and an increased canal system in the Yellow River Valley. After consolidating the north he conquered the south of China in 589. He was known to history as Emperor Wen.
To consolidate their power the T’o-pa instituted three innovations, which contributed to its political ascendancy. First they increased the centralization of the government by extending the hierarchy. The shih families had grown in size and power during the decline of the imperial government. The T’o-pa reclaimed control by taking charge of the appointment of all officials, including local ones. This extended the power of the central government even beyond that of the Han. Generally in the feudal system the aristocracy communicates with their fellow aristocracy for military and political cooperation. Under the imperial system the government appoints officials to govern locally. Although the T’o-pa tended to respect the power of the clans, they appointed their own government officials.
Second they instituted the well-field system to better collect taxes. In this system, at death one’s land reverted to the government pool. When one came of age one was given one’s portion of land. Thus taxes could be more easily regulated and collected as theoretically everyone had the same size of land. While the big shih families were somewhat exempt from land redistribution, the churches were totally exempt. Many of the peasantry donated their land to the churches, especially to the Buddhist temples and monasteries.
The third innovation of the T'o-pa, which became standard Chinese military policy, was to establish military garrisons on the frontiers of their empire accompanied by permanent settlements. This was different from the strategy of a military operation, where the imperial army would sweep in and the nomadic army would disappear. The Imperial army would go back home and the nomadic army would return.
The big problem was the arid Ordos Plain. It was an easy attack from here into the Yellow River valley or over into Peking. While including the upper Yellow River, it was primarily suited for a nomadic, not an agri, culture. The Chinese agri-culture did not naturally migrate and settle there. Not to mention the fact that the Ordos plain was most vulnerable to attack from the nomadic empires. With proper irrigation, the Ordos Plain could be used for farming, but its vulnerability to attack, made the maintenance of an irrigation system impossible. Realizing the military importance of the Ordos Plain and the impossibility of permanently vanquishing the nomadic tribes, having been recently nomadic themselves, the T'o-pa stationed permanent troops in this area with their own peasants, whom they were assigned to protect. These garrisons on the boundary sometimes became a political force in their own right.
While this was an effective way of maintaining their boundaries against nomadic attack, these garrisons, especially in the Ordos plain, needed an Imperial investment. They were not self-supporting. During periods of nomadic or semi-nomadic rule, the importance of this investment was understood. During periods of more Chinese rule or of a weak imperial government, they couldn't justify the expense. Many times even unto the Ming dynasty of the 15th century, the elitist Chinese administrators felt it beneath them to have to deal with these 'inferior' nomadic cultures. The stronger Chinese governments normally wanted a military action to end all actions to teach those barbarians a lesson. Of course this never worked. The Ming took the next step and just built a wall to keep the nomads out. This is the Great Wall of China.
Anyway the semi-nomadic T'o-pa, who founded the Sui Dynasty, followed by rulers of the early T'ang understood the importance of these military garrisons to the peace and stability of the inner Empire. Further these institutional changes strengthened the power and stability of the central government – allowing them to rule a large and expanding geography for centuries.
Chronology of the Sui & T’ang Emperors
In 604 Emperor Wen’s son, half-Chinese and half-T’o-pa, reportedly poisoned his father and took command. He is known as Emperor Yang. He completed and extended his father’s domestic projects, building roads, canals, grain depots and walls. It was he that built the Great Canal system linking the Yangtze and Yellow River Valleys through their many tributaries. He also attempted to expand China’s military influence. While initially successful, he expended a lot of military effort unsuccessfully to conquer Korea and then was routed by the Turks in 617. The decline of imperial power combined with their harsh conscription policies led to domestic uprisings. He sent the Duke of T’ang to put down the Turkish invasion and went into retirement.
The Duke of T’ang seized control and established a puppet Sui government. When Emperor Yang died, he accepted the abdication of the Sui heir forming the beginning of the T’ang dynasty in 618. After 8 years of hard campaigning against political rivals, he achieved prominence. He is known historically as Kao-tsu. He like Emperor Yang before him was half-Chinese, half-nomad.
His son, T’ai-tsung, (626-649), forced his father to abdicate and proceeded to expand the T’ang empire far beyond what even Emperor Wen of the Han had achieved. He was a humane administrator, listened to advice, and was an excellent general. Because of this he was considered an ideal Chinese Emperor. With his death, one of his concubines seized control. Her long rule (650-705) was a continuation of what went before. She maintained the borders and internal stability. She is known as Empress Wu, the only woman to officially become Empress of China.
After a brief period of instability, Hsüan-tsung (712-756) ascended to the throne ruling through the T’ang Golden Age. Near the end of his reign in 745 he became infatuated with a concubine, Lady Yang, falling under her influence. He lost interest in government and in 750 a tribe of Yünnan setup government in southwest China. This was the beginning of the long decline of the T’ang. An imperial army sent to reassert control was routed. In 751 the Arab/Turkic Moslem expansion reached its zenith in Central Asia defeating the Chinese Imperial army in the northwest. Soon after in 755 a Turkish favorite of Lady Yang who had been made general revolted in the interior.
The T’ang government retreated south, as always. The T’ang relied on the Turkish and Arabic tribes to reestablish control. When control was reestablished the mighty T’ang Empire had become vassals of her allies. It took another 100 years however for the T’ang to fade out. In 907 the last T’ang Emperor abdicated ending the extended T’ang Empire.
A few points need to be made, as always. First in the political changes of these centuries the fluidity of the aristocracy is quite marked. The governments change capitals easily. The stable peasantry has no say in whether Mongols, Turks, Tibetans, or Chinese rule them. The battles are between armies of warriors. The peasants merely change military aristocracies.
Along this line the extreme affinity between the nomadic tribes on their perimeter and the Chinese aristocracy is marked. Sons and daughters are regularly offered in marriage to the ‘barbarian’ tribes. Indeed the main difference between the two aristocracies seems to lie more in the geography that they rule rather than any ideological differences.
The dry arid geography of the steppes does not support agriculture. Hence the nations of the steppes are based upon nomadic culture, which is an inherently military culture, as we’ve attempted to establish. This is opposite to the connotations of the word pastoral. Thus these military aristocracies with their warrior-kings take turn dominating the agricultural peasantry living in China. The changes in government have very little to do with the peasantry and everything to do with who has the strongest military force. This cycle is just a continuation of the millennia old process whereby the military aristocracies which regularly develop in the northwest steppes infiltrate south, replacing the prior military aristocracy who has become militarily weakened over the centuries through participation in the sedentary agricultural life.
When we say that the peasantry has very little say in the government this is a gross simplification, which must be modified by the knowledge that the over all goal of the peasantry is social stability. Further through the centuries it has become manifestly clear that stability is generally preferable to freedom. Freedom from the imperial government tends overall to lead to social chaos, with everyone attempting to take over leadership of the country. Hence the peasantry tends to support the imperial government, which will provide the most security from attack. Rather be exploited than plundered, raped and pillaged.
Thus cultural ideology is secondary to stability for the peasantry. They don’t care if their rulers are Chinese or ‘barbarian’ as long as social stability is achieved. Once social stability is achieved, the second goal is tolerance. If tolerance threatens social stability then it must go, for social stability is first. According to surviving records, the Han had a population of 60 million, which was halved to 30 million during the period of unrest. It took until the second century of the T’ang before it reached 60 million again. The disruption of social stability has lethal consequences for the Chinese peasantry.
Thus Emperor Wen was certainly appealing to peasant values when he championed religious tolerance and social works. That he was a great general allowed him to win his battles, but his social policies were what allowed him to achieve social consolidation that hadn’t been achieved before. If the peasantry is just choosing between one despot or another, there is no loyalty generated; while if one of these despots also attempts to strengthen the social structure, then the influence of the peasantry provides cohesion to hold the political structure together.
Emperor Yang, who followed, was fatally flawed in terms of the peasantry because of his unsuccessful wars of military expansion. Further tainting him was the fact that he murdered his father. Although patricide and fratricide was quite common in the Turkic political environment from which he emerged as a half-breed, this was unacceptable behavior for the Chinese, who stressed familial piety as a virtue. His social works are incredible, certainly benefiting social cohesion and trade. The Great Canal system, the granaries, and his road system were all notable projects that were certainly good for the country. While all these projects benefited the country as a whole, it is rumored that millions of peasants were dislocated and perished in the process. Thus the peasantry were not happy about this side to the social works.
More important for the Chinese is the fact that he lost in the end. Obviously Emperor Yang was a typical warrior king along the lines of Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Genghis Kahn and the like. He was not happy unless he was campaigning. While successful in the traditional areas of Chinese domination, he seemed to feel personally challenged to conquer Korea, one of the geographies rarely dominated by the Chinese Imperial government. He expended all of his military energy unsuccessfully in the northeast, which significantly weakened his army. This made his government vulnerable to invasion from the northwest. Hence although his public works projects were incredible, he was tainted by his military failures and by his alienation of the peasantry because of his massive conscription’s to complete his construction projects and man his armies.
Because of the relative shortness and rigidity of the Sui dynasty, and their public works projects, the dynasty has been compared to Ch’in dynasty of the First Emperor. While their achievements pale in comparison to that of the First Emperor[4], they do have the similarity that the rigidity of their regimes allowed the tolerance of the following Han and T’ang dynasties. Metal was applied to the wood and then removed. The Tao was allowed to spontaneously transform after discipline was applied. Hence while later historians have called him a lunatic and madman, indeed his incredible public works projects contributed mightily to the flowering of the T’ang in the centuries that followed.
In some ways Emperor Yang was just a normal warrior-king who was second best. While second best is fine in artistic accomplishment, it means death in battle for the warrior culture. He was just following the typical warrior code, which was fight until death, campaign until losing. This semi-instinctual warrior code has inspired a multitude of military conquerors through to Germany’s Hitler of the 20th century. The peasantry tends to favor military consolidation and disapprove of military expansion. The disapproval is not morally based; it is only because of the excessive conscription.
The first T’ang emperors were from the same warrior-king mold. Kao-Tsu, who followed, battled his entire reign to consolidate the country. While his son, T’ai-tsung, using the military momentum spent his reign expanding the empire, he was successful and so was approved of by later generations. Nothing breeds admiration like success. This seems to be a universal human tendency.
Empress Wu, while ruthless in her quest for and retention of her political power, maintained social stability and prosperity throughout her reign and so was approved of by the peasantry. While not providing a good moral example in the Confucian sense, to the people, her rule was marked by social stability. Thus she was considered good. This shows that the peasant morality of the Chinese transcends the somewhat the academic Confucian morality of the literate elite.[5]
One last point is that because of the fluidity of the aristocracy combined with their cultural affinity with the nomadic aristocracy, that the extent of Chinese imperial influence had to do with nomadic control. The point is that Emperor Wen of the Sui, although Chinese, was ruling from midst of the nomadic T’o-pa power structure. His son was half T’o-pa. The Duke of T’ang, i.e. Kao Tzu, and his son, T’ai-tsung, were also half nomad. Hence these emperors were not Chinese who understood the nomadic mind as much as they were unique individuals participating in both cultures. Because of this cross-cultural connection they understood both traditions. T’ai-tsung was even acknowledged as grand khan of the Turks. This was partly because of this military prowess and part because of his nomadic bloodline. Full blooded Chinese are not even considered and don’t even want to be acknowledged as khans.
There are a few consequence of this line of reasoning. First the intermarriage between the nomadic and Chinese aristocracy also created many nomadic bloodlines that were related to Chinese imperial blood. Thus while the Chinese Emperor could claim to be great khan of the Turkic tribes through heredity, the nomadic rulers could also claim that they had the hereditary right to rule China. Frequently in Chinese history, through to the Manchus of the 17th century, the military aristocracy of the nomadic cultures have claimed the role of Emperor of China on the rights of bloodline.
The second point is that the further the Emperors become assimilated into Chinese ways and divorced from their nomadic roots, the less control they have of the military cultures of the steppes. This inevitably leads to lack of mutual respect with the consequent military action between cultures. Hsüan-tsung, quite a few generations removed from his nomadic bloodline had little cultural understanding of the military nomadic cultures.
The third point is that while we traditionally think of the cultured advanced Chinese and the barbaric northern nomadic cultures, that in reality there was a parity and even identity between the two. Obviously there was military parity between the two cultures. Most of the time the innovations came from the nomadic cultures of the north, i.e. the bronze military technology including the chariot, horseback riding soldier and the compound bow are a few examples. There were never enough nomads to invade China so they just simply regularly established themselves as rulers over the agricultural peasantry. Thus the Chinese aristocracy is the nomadic aristocracy a few generations removed.
Additionally the further removed from the nomadic roots the more likely they are to be dominated by the military nomadic cultures. This was the case of Hsüan-tsung. While cultured, ruling over the height of the T’ang golden age, he had lost the military momentum of his nomadic blood and lost control of his military and eventually control of the Empire.
The point we are leading to is that the military aristocracy of China, especially during this period, was made up of nomadic leaders who had intermarried with the Chinese military aristocracy for mutual gain. In general the Chinese and nomadic aristocracy had more in common with each other than they did with their populace. This is quite different from the traditional conception that the Chinese as a group were separate from the nomadic cultures on their borders. While the populace of the two cultures differ markedly, the ruling classes of the two had a remarkable affinity. It was this class who was ‘the hereditary landowning elite’. They called themselves by the traditional name shih, which we saw during the Chou. This was the word for warrior-officials. Their roots were probably in the Shang. Thus almost 2000 years later this group is still ruling China. But now their rule has become institutionalized.
“The hereditary landowning elite, who called themselves shih (the ancient term for warrior-officials), more than ever monopolized political power. They began compiling genealogical records to keep clear who was and who was not a shih. The tribal chiefs of the northern nomads assumed status as shih and even invented genealogies tracing their ancestry back to great men of China’s past, especially the Han ministers and generals. It became the rule that only shih of certified honorable ancestry were eligible for appointment in the government.”[6]
Centuries of social instability had thrown the peasantry into the arms of the military aristocracy, the shih, for protection. For protection they gave up their freedom, but at least they got survival.
[1]China to 1850, p. 79
[2]Constantine of Rome moved the Roman Empire from Rome in Italy to Constantinople in Turkey. Peter the Great of Russia moved his capital to St. Petersburg. Louis the XIV of France moved his capital to Versailles. These moves were made from a point of strength rather than a position of weakness.
[3]Let it be pointed out that this was not so true in Scotland. The royalty with heavy English ties inspired very little enthusiasm in the Highlands of Scotland. Indeed the local clans remained relatively autonomous until after the debacle of 1745, when they rose in rebellion, lost the fight, and were banned.
[4]Emperor Yang for all his public works, neither unified the country, nor did he standardize the script or the weights and measures of trade. While his Canal System connected the plains of the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, this was a process initiated by his exceptionally talented father, Emperor Wen, who consolidated China through his promises of tolerance.
[5]We see this in America at the end of the 2nd millennium with Clinton as president. Although his personal morals seem to be wanting, he is popular because of his job as president. The opposing party is attempting to make a big deal of his morals, while the public doesn’t really seem to care.
[6] China to 1850. p. 81
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